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KIERKEGAARD AND  
THE CLASSICAL VIRTUE TRADITION
Mark A. Tietjen
This paper affirms the thesis that Kierkegaard can be properly and profit-
ably read in light of the virtue tradition, broadly construed. I consider several 
objections to this thesis, including the idea that Kierkegaard largely opposes 
the culture of antiquity out of which the virtue tradition comes, that Kierkeg-
aard’s emphasis on duty and the commanded nature of love is incompatible 
with genuine concerns of virtue ethics, and that Kierkegaard’s concept of faith 
is incompatible with a strong concern for the virtues. Then I offer two av-
enues for broadening our thinking about his ethical philosophy in light of the 
attention he pays to the virtues. First, I argue that we may beneficially read 
Kierkegaard alongside Jane Austen, as someone whose writings reflect both 
the Christian and Aristotelian traditions. Second, in terms of contemporary 
moral philosophy, I suggest that Kierkegaard be placed in conversation with 
“radical virtue ethics,” a category recently introduced by David Solomon.
Any sympathies with ancient philosophy that might be present in Kierkeg-
aard’s thought have undoubtedly been overshadowed in the twentieth 
century by existentialist interpretations1 (where Kierkegaard anticipates 
Sartre et al.) and more recently by postmodern, literary deconstructionist 
ones (where Kierkegaard anticipates Derrida et al.).2 Scholars have not 
been entirely blind to the appreciation for and debt to certain features 
of Greek philosophy Kierkegaard’s writings betray, however. His fond-
ness for Socrates—as much a thinker concerned with virtue as Aristotle—
was popularly vocalized by one of the early translators of Kierkegaard 
into English, David Swenson, who referred to Kierkegaard as the “Dan-
ish Socrates.”3 More recently, the collection of essays Kierkegaard after 
1For a definitive rejection of the ‘existentialist Kierkegaard’ see Robert C. Roberts, “The 
Virtue of Hope in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses,” in International Kierkegaard Commentary: 
“Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses,” ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 
2003), pp. 181–203.
2I do not mean to suggest that these are the only views that have been available to Ki-
erkegaard’s readers, but just that these interpretations have had, in my view, a measure of 
(popular) dominance. For a more detailed (and literary) take on the variety of interpretations 
of Kierkegaard in the last century, see Roger Poole’s “The Unknown Kierkegaard: Twentieth-
Century Receptions,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. Alastair Hannay and 
Gordon Marino (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 48–75. 
3See David Swenson, Something about Kierkegaard (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1941).
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MacIntyre4 indirectly brought this connection to the fore in its explora-
tion of Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique of Kierkegaard in chapter four of 
After Virtue. In this paper I wish to advance the thesis that Kierkegaard 
can and ought to be read as a member of the western virtue tradition that 
extends, according to theologian David Gouwens, “from Plato and Ar-
istotle through Plutarch, orthodox Christianity and [is] addressed anew 
in Pietism and in moral philosophers such as Kant.”5 It is a tradition that 
has, in the last fifty years, been reinvigorated by figures such as Elizabeth 
Anscombe and MacIntyre. 
In his essay in Kierkegaard after MacIntyre, historian Bruce Kirmmse con-
trasts the respective criticisms of modernity offered a century and one-
half ago by Kierkegaard, and more recently by MacIntyre. In the course of 
the article, Kirmmse raises two problems for those of us who would offer 
an interpretation of Kierkegaard as a kind of virtue ethicist. The basis of 
these concerns is Kierkegaard’s Christianity, which Kirmmse takes to be 
at odds both with classical Greek culture in general and its conception of 
a virtue in particular. I will take up both issues, as well as the objection 
that Kierkegaard’s emphasis on duty and the commanded nature of love 
is incompatible with genuine concerns of virtue ethics. Upon addressing 
potential problems with this association, I suggest two ways to think of 
Kierkegaard in light of the virtue tradition by juxtaposing themes central 
to his writings with those of the novelist Jane Austen and an approach to 
the virtues David Solomon has labeled “radical virtue ethics.”
Objection One: Kierkegaard Opposes the Classical Tradition
An important part of MacIntyre’s critique of modernity in After Virtue in-
volves accusations he makes against Kierkegaard as a proponent of an 
ethic of radical choice. Robert C. Roberts places MacIntyre’s view of Ki-
erkegaard in context: “This Sartrean Kierkegaard is the anti-hero of Alas-
dair MacIntyre’s saga of the Enlightenment project of finding a rational 
foundation for morality.”6 Kirmmse convincingly demonstrates how 
MacIntyre’s charges rest on a misunderstanding. Kierkegaard, too, was 
highly critical of modernity—namely, the ethical theories that immediate-
ly preceded him in Kant and Hegel—and what Kirmmse calls “Romantic 
philhellenism.”7 
According to Kirmmse, Kierkegaard “was unable to feel much nostal-
gia” for the classical tradition and its forms of life that determine the roles 
4John J. Davenport and Anthony Rudd, ed., Kierkegaard after MacIntyre: Essays on Freedom, 
Narrative, and Virtue (Chicago: Open Court, 2001).
5David Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), p. 94.
6Robert C. Roberts, “Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, and a Method of ‘Virtue Ethics,’” in Ki-
erkegaard in Post/Modernity, ed. Martin J. Matuštík and Merold Westphal (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1995), pp. 148–149.
7Bruce Kirmmse, “Kierkegaard and MacIntyre: Possibilities for Dialogue,” in Kierkegaard 
after MacIntyre, p. 193.
KIERKEGAARD AND THE CLASSICAL VIRTUE TRADITION 155
we humans play.8 Kierkegaard reads Greek life as full of anxiety based in 
significant part on the ancient conception of fate. While Socrates breaks 
with the traditional answer to the Euthyphro question, Kirmmse contends 
that mainstream Greek culture largely felt that its well-being was a func-
tion of the moods of the gods—what Kirmmse calls “‘zero-sum’ fatalism.”9 
Even Socrates, at times, represents the zero-sum approach when on his 
deathbed he asks Crito to sacrifice a cock to Asclepius. Kirmmse notes 
Socrates’ “witheringly ironic insistence that life itself is an illness, while 
death is deliverance, healing.”10 On this view, it seems the ancients get 
no further than this bleak outlook on life. (Kirmmse agrees with MacIn-
tyre that Kant gets no further, either.) Kirmmse believes that Kierkegaard 
would have criticized MacIntyre “for being insufficiently cognizant of 
the radical difference between Christianity and classical culture.”11 For 
Kierkegaard, says Kirmmse, “the crisis of classical fatalism” can only be 
fixed by Christianity, “which teaches that existence is more than a zero-
sum game.”12 Christianity’s primary distinction from paganism is that 
God supplies the condition, something outside of us, that provides mean-
ing for life. Kirmmse continues, “just as MacIntyre draws his great divide 
between the classical-medieval and modern periods, Kierkegaard draws 
his great divide between classical and Christian.”13
While distinctions Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms draw between 
Greek life and thought and Christianity should not be overlooked or 
downplayed, Kirmmse seems mistaken in this comment about Kierkeg-
aard.14 Kierkegaard rarely polemicizes against the Greeks, but rather 
treats them as, at times, relatively innocent pagans (innocent in that they 
lacked the Christian revelation and especially the concept of sin).15 While 
8Ibid. 
9Ibid. I will withhold critique of Kirmmse’s view of the Greeks here, since my concern is 





14Kirmmse defends this reading of Kierkegaard’s view of the Greeks by depending almost 
exclusively (at least as far as references go) on The Concept of Anxiety. As Kierkegaard himself 
reminds us in “A First and Last Explanation” following the text of the pseudonymous Conclud-
ing Unscientific Postscript, however, we should hesitate to allow Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms (in 
this case, Vigilius Haufniensis) to speak for Kierkegaard or to represent his views. While I am 
sympathetic to finding agreement between Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms, Kirmmse’s case 
would be stronger if he relied more on signed works (including the journals). In this paper I 
shall credit pseudonymous works to their respective pseudonym (e.g., Fear and Trembling to 
Johannes de silentio), though for the most part the ideas I shall take from the pseudonymous 
writings are ones I believe to be compatible with Kierkegaard’s own thoughts on the matter.
15One thinks of Johannes Climacus’s pagan who relates to the wrong deity in the right 
way, and in Climacus’s mind, is closer to truth than the Christian who relates in the wrong 
way to the right deity. Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to “Philosophical 
Fragments,” trans. and ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1992), p. 201. C. Stephen Evans distinguishes between three of Kierkeg-
aard’s targets in Works of Love: the unspoiled pagan, the spoiled pagan, and the deluded 
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Kierkegaard might not seem as nostalgic as Kirmmse implies MacIntyre 
to be, it seems too strong to attribute to Kierkegaard an out-and-out rejec-
tion of ancient Greece. For one thing, throughout his writings Kierkegaard 
views one of its monumental figures, Socrates, not as a zero-sum fatalist, 
but as a masterful ethicist: one who cares for virtue and whose life-work 
is devoted to persuading others to care for virtue.16 Kierkegaard holds So-
crates in high esteem not just in the pseudonymous works17 but in the 
signed, religious writings too.18 Second, if Kierkegaard’s ‘great divide’ is 
between Christianity and the classical world, what are we to do with the 
modern period? After all, Kierkegaard directs his ‘attacks’ not against the 
Greeks but against Hegelianism and its infiltration into the Danish Lu-
theran church. Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus directs his 
own attacks against modern philosophy (especially Descartes and Hegel) 
with the aid of Greek philosophy and especially Socrates.19 
If we must view Kierkegaard’s thought in terms of a dichotomy, surely 
the modern era cannot be assimilated with classical thought, because, for 
one thing, it has developed within a “Christian” Europe. But modernity 
clearly does not fall on the Christian side of the divide, either. That is 
the primary problem Kierkegaard’s works address: Christianity contami-
nated by modernity. It is probably a mistake for Kirmmse to set up a 
Kierkegaardian dichotomy at all,20 but it is clearly wrong that he ignores 
pagan. Evans believes Kierkegaard places the Greeks, the innocent pagans, in the former 
category (Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations [Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004], pp. 114–115.)
16Again, Kirmmse’s reading of Kierkegaard’s view of Socrates depends almost exclusively 
on the view presented in The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard’s dissertation. Besides the fact that 
Kierkegaard does not consider this book part of his authorship proper, there is significant 
consensus that Kierkegaard’s view of Socrates changes significantly after the dissertation. 
That is, after The Concept of Irony this negative view of Socrates rarely, if ever, surfaces. For an 
early example of this view, see James Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard (Princeton, NJ: Princ-
eton University Press, 1983), p. 151 (originally published in 1953). See also David Gouwens, 
Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, p. 44 n. 45; and John Lippitt, Humour and Irony in Kierkegaard’s 
Thought (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 146.
17E.g., “Yet it is possible that in the Socratic ignorance there was more truth in Socrates 
than in the objective truth of the entire system that flirts with the demands of the times and 
adapts itself to assistant professors” (Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 202). 
See also pp. 131, 147, 162, and 207.
18E.g., Søren Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses; The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Ac-
tress, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1997), p. 241; Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong 
and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 37, 133; Works of 
Love, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1995), pp. 276–277; and For Self-Examination / Judge for Yourself!, ed. and trans. Howard 
V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 9–10.
19“This much, however, is certain, that with speculative thought everything goes back-
ward, back past the Socratic, which at least comprehended that for an existing person exist-
ing is the essential” (Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 212). And, “Socrates 
politely and indirectly took the untruth away from the learner and gave him the truth, 
whereas speculative thought politely and indirectly takes the truth away from the learner 
and gives him the untruth” (Ibid., p. 219). 
20I suspect that he does so to facilitate a comparison of Kierkegaard to MacIntyre.
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modernity here, precisely because elsewhere in the article he argues that 
Kierkegaard is a more radical critic of modernity than MacIntyre him-
self.21 I would argue that if one has to force Kierkegaard into positing 
some divide, it would be between Christianity and paganism, where pa-
ganism takes on all stripes that include the pre-Christian Greeks as well as 
the post-Christian Hegelians. But perhaps one is better off without such 
attempts at simplification.
Kirmmse is right to point out that many concepts of Christianity stand 
in opposition to classical ones (including classical virtue ethics) in many 
ways, but what about the similarities? Roberts points out several gen-
eral features Kierkegaard’s thought shares with that of both the ancient 
Greeks22 and the church fathers. These features include the notions that 
humans are “capable of having a stable character,” that they possess “a 
given human nature independently of our trait development,” that “traits 
are dispositions to passive or quasi-passive episodic states of the subject 
such as emotions, perceptions, and thoughts,” and that these traits are in-
terconnected and “make or fail to make for the well-being, happiness, eu-
daimonia, or flourishing of those who possess them and those who associ-
ate with those who possess them.”23 Both Kierkegaard and classical virtue 
theorists “are typically preoccupied with moral and spiritual education, 
upbringing, upbuilding, formation, deep psychological development.”24 
In addition to these features, David Gouwens notes “the development of 
ongoing intentions, dispositions, judgments, and motivations that charac-
terize a person over time” that place Kierkegaard in the ‘broad tradition.’25 
This is only a preliminary list, and yet to ignore these likenesses is to exag-
gerate Kierkegaard’s differences with the classical virtue tradition. Cer-
tainly, as Roberts argues, Kierkegaard has more in common with Aristotle 
than he does with Camus or Sartre. 
Objection Two: Commanded Love is Incompatible with Virtue Ethics
One might grant that Kierkegaard shares with virtue thinkers certain 
broad assumptions about human nature and existence, and yet point out 
that he seems to lack the sort of teleological vision of the good character-
istic of a virtue ethic. Kierkegaard instead emphasizes concepts like duty 
and the right, and even love is a ‘virtue’ that is commanded. This objection 
is misguided, however. Kierkegaard does have a vision of the good that 
shapes his work, and this is evident particularly in Works of Love, arguably 
21See Kirmmse, “Kierkegaard and MacIntyre: Possibilities for Dialogue,” pp. 191, 193, 
202–203.
22Julia Annas has argued that the theoretical structure of virtue ethics underlies not just 
Aristotle but “all of ancient ethical theory” (“Virtue Ethics,” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical 
Theory, ed. David Copp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 515). See also her The Moral-
ity of Happiness and Platonic Ethics Old and New. 
23Robert C. Roberts, “The Virtue of Hope in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses,” pp. 187–188.
24Ibid., p. 188.
25Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, p. 94.
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his most important work of ethics. Despite the emphasis there on the com-
manded nature of love, Kierkegaard’s exegesis of that concept and many 
other virtue concepts elsewhere in his writings suggest a much more 
complex picture of the moral life that shares elements with human nature 
theories that tend to emphasize the actualization of certain potential traits 
within human nature.26 
There are two sections of Works of Love that shed light on these issues: 
first, the ‘deliberation’ “Love is a Matter of Conscience,” and second, the 
conclusion. Like most of the deliberations in Works of Love, ‘Conscience’ 
takes scripture as its point of departure: “But the sum of the command-
ment is love out of a pure heart and out of a good conscience and out of 
a sincere faith” (I Tim. 1:5). The command of Christ equates to a set of 
three dispositions, virtues, to be inculcated in the life of the Christian. 
Kierkegaard expounds the three in turn, emphasizing especially the sec-
ond. His focus on the cultivation of these dispositions as the accomplish-
ment of the commandment provides an important counterweight to the 
previous deliberation “Love is the Fulfilling of the Law” by placing the 
conscience as the locus of the God-human relationship. “[T]o relate to 
God is precisely to have a conscience.”27 Thus, the deontological notion 
of one’s duty to follow God, to obey God’s command to love, can also be 
viewed from the other side as a human developing a good conscience. 
The following quotation portrays how the very purpose of the command 
is to bring about within an individual a dispositional excellence:
The merely human point of view conceives of love either solely in terms of 
immediacy, as drives and inclination (erotic love), as inclination (friend-
ship), as feeling and inclination, with one or another differentiating alloy of 
duty, natural relations, prescriptive rights, etc., or as something to be aspired 
to and attained because the understanding perceives that to be loved and 
favored . . . is an earthly good. Christianity is not really concerned with all 
this. . . . Christianity allows all this to remain in force and have its signifi-
cance externally, but at the same time through its doctrine about love, which 
is not predicated on comfortableness, it wants to have infinity’s change take 
place internally.28
For Kierkegaard then, Aristotle and Kant each have their place in drawing 
particular emphases on the reasons one is obliged to act in certain ways. 
For the Christian, the command of God is a necessary condition. And yet, 
the point of the command is not arbitrary but intimately tied to human 
nature—its flourishing and perfection. 
26C. Stephen Evans describes the ethic the pseudonym Johannes Climacus puts forth in 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript as a ‘soul-making ethic’ which, similarly to Kierkegaard’s 
view in Works of Love, incorporates both Aristotelian themes of self-actualization and flour-
ishing and a Kantian emphasis on duty. See chapter five of Kierkegaard’s Fragments and 
Postscript: The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities 
Press, 1983). 
27Kierkegaard, Works of Love, p. 143. 
28Ibid., p. 143–144.
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In “A Kierkegaardian View of the Foundations of Morality,” C. Stephen 
Evans draws the following conclusion that bears directly on the objection 
that given Kierkegaard’s emphasis on duty and commanded love, there is 
little room for the concerns that lie behind human nature theories such as 
virtue ethics:
the human nature and divine command elements in Kierkegaard’s thinking 
are not in contradiction. . . . we could say that for Kierkegaard the self we 
must strive to become is a self that was created for a relationship with God 
and therefore that persons should strive to attain the faith in God that makes 
such a relationship possible. . . . This coincidence of the task of becoming 
yourself and achieving a God-relationship is expressed in Fear and Trembling 
when Abraham’s motive for being willing to sacrifice Isaac is characterized: 
“Why, then, does Abraham do it? For God’s sake and—the two are wholly 
identical—for his own sake.”29
Thus, the features of Kierkegaard’s ethical thought that draw on Christian 
theology or some Kantian debt must not be understood as exclusive of 
other features that more closely resemble human nature theories such as 
virtue ethics.
More evidence that Kierkegaard’s discussion of the commanded nature 
of Christian love is not just compatible but coincident with a view that 
emphasizes the virtues and a teleological vision of the good can be found 
in the conclusion to Works of Love, where the scriptural point of departure 
is the exhortation, not command: “Beloved, let us love one another” (I Jn. 
4:7). Kierkegaard writes:
These words, which have apostolic authority, also have, if you consider 
them, an intermediate tone or an intermediate mood in connection with the 
contrasts in love itself. The basis of this is that they are by one who was per-
fected in love. You do not hear the rigorousness of duty in these words; the 
apostle does not say, “You shall love one another . . . ”30
The assumption is that the aged apostle John has responded to the com-
mand of Christ in obedience, and what that looks like is a mature charac-
ter quality, an excellence. Moreover, it is an excellence intimately tied with 
Kierkegaard’s vision of the good for a human life: “The commandment is 
that you shall love, but ah, if you will understand yourself and your life, 
then it seems that it should not need to be commanded, because to love 
people is the only thing worth living for, and without this love you are 
not really living.”31 Once again, while the objector is correct to point out 
Kierkegaard’s emphasis on duty, this does not, for Kierkegaard, preclude 
those concerns most important to virtue ethicists: the cultivation of vir-
tues in accordance with some teleological conception of the good. As to 
29C. Stephen Evans, “A Kierkegaardian View of the Foundations of Morality,” in Christian 
Theism and Moral Philosophy, ed. Michael Beaty, Carlton Fisher, and Mark Nelson (Macon, 
GA: Mercer University Press, 1998), p. 71. 
30Kierkegaard, Works of Love, p. 375.
31Ibid.
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the content of the conception of the good, Kierkegaard like Aquinas will 
situate that in Christian revelation, whereas non-theistic teleological eth-
ics will arrive at their conception without such appeal. 
Objection Three: Kierkegaardian Faith is Opposed to Virtue
Kirmmse’s second worry about reading Kierkegaard alongside virtue 
thinkers like MacIntyre involves the specific concept of a virtue. On an 
Aristotelian account, a moral virtue is a dispositional excellence one at-
tains through repeatedly acting in an appropriate manner at an appropri-
ate time for an appropriate reason. While, importantly, one needs the right 
sort of community—especially good teachers and parents—and external 
goods like wealth and even beauty to become virtuous, each person has 
within him or herself the power to attain virtuous character. Philip Quinn 
correctly anticipates an incongruity between this sort of conception of vir-
tue and Christianity. Such a view of virtue implies that “Practical reason 
operating apart from religious influences offers humans their best shot 
at working out for themselves good lives.”32 We might ask, is a Christian 
virtue ethic possible in the first place? Kirmmse hints that, at least for a 
Lutheran like Kierkegaard, it is not: “one wonders indeed whether it is 
useful to speak of Christian “virtues” at all.”33
Kirmmse wants to draw a categorical divide between the unique con-
cepts of Christianity, e.g., grace and sin, and the concepts of classical mo-
rality represented, for instance, by Aristotle. In The Sickness unto Death, 
Kierkegaard’s ideal Christian pseudonym Anti-Climacus suggests such a 
sharp divide, exemplified by the Socratic definition of sin as ignorance. 
This view is profoundly different from the Christian view, sin as willful 
defiance, which Anti-Climacus contends was absent in the classical world. 
While, as stated above, Kirmmse affirms a few points of possible dialogue 
between a virtue ethicist like MacIntyre and Kierkegaard, he insists that 
Kierkegaard’s radical Christian views are largely incompatible with a care 
for the virtues. “Kierkegaard’s way of thinking does indeed come “after 
virtue,” but only because he insists that everything after the arrival of 
Christianity is after virtue, and that faith is what Christianity puts forth 
instead of virtue.”34
If Kirmmse and Quinn are correct that Christianity is incompatible 
with a classical conception of the virtues, what place do the “virtues” have 
in Christianity? What of faith, hope and love, and what of the Galatian 
“fruits of the Spirit” (love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faith-
fulness, gentleness, and self-control)? Surely those who disallow the pos-
sibility of a Christian virtue ethic must give some account of the many 
apparent virtues present throughout Scripture. If there is a place for these 
32Philip Quinn, “The Primacy of God’s Will in Christian Ethics,” in Christian Theism and 
Moral Philosophy, p. 280. 
33Kirmmse, “Kierkegaard and MacIntyre: Possibilities for Dialogue,” p. 198.
34Ibid., p. 197.
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virtues in Christianity, can that place be significant in a way that still al-
lows for God’s grace?35 
At the same time, one may ask whether Kierkegaard is opposed to a 
virtue ethic as Kirmmse suggests. If so, how does one make sense of the 
many virtues expounded throughout his works? Since Kierkegaard does 
value the distinct doctrines of sin and grace, can he give due importance to 
the virtues and still remain orthodox? Does it enfeeble the notion of virtue 
to claim that we can cultivate it only through an act of God’s grace? 
When Kirmmse says “faith is what Christianity puts forth instead of 
virtue,” he refers to the Christian pseudonym Anti-Climacus’s (biblically-
derived) claim in The Sickness unto Death: “the opposite of sin is not virtue 
but faith.”36 However, he ignores the fact that faith has long been viewed 
by Jews and Christians as a kind of virtue, a character trait that one should 
strive to cultivate and work out, albeit in fear and trembling. How might 
one reconcile this incongruity? Roberts views Anti-Climacus’s claim as “a 
grammatical remark about sin,” that understands by ‘virtue’ what Aristo-
tle’s magnanimous man might embody.37 This view of virtue can be char-
acterized by a high degree of pride and glory in one’s moral character and 
accomplishments—a view where divine assistance is absent. However, 
as MacIntyre tells us, there are a wide array of “virtue collections” (each 
also containing its own definition of what a virtue is, generally speak-
ing) including those of Aristotle, the New Testament, the Icelandic Sagas, 
Benjamin Franklin, and Nietzsche. As Roberts writes, “Once we acknowl-
edge that different virtues, belonging to different traditions, have different 
grammars, it is quite natural to grant, with the broad Christian tradition, 
that the virtue of faith—the disposition to acknowledge, trust, and love 
God—is the opposite of sin.”38 If we can understand faith as a virtue in this 
sense, and yet salvation according to Paul comes through grace alone by 
faith, then it would seem that the possession of virtues is compatible with 
distinctive Christian concepts like grace and sin. 
Christian Virtue and the Christian Virtue of Faith
Whether a Christian virtue ethic is possible depends on how loosely or 
how tightly one draws the bounds of virtue ethics, and this is largely a 
function of how one defines virtue. If one wishes to argue for reading 
Kierkegaard in this broad tradition, one must first be clear about how he 
departs from classical virtue thinking. Thus, Kirmmse is correct that Ki-
erkegaard’s views of virtue and the virtues are by no means identical to 
35Quinn suggests that Christian moral philosophers should “join Aquinas in holding that 
virtue consists chiefly in conformity with God’s will and obedience to his commands,” in 
“The Primacy of God’s Will in Christian Ethics,” p. 284.
36Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna 
H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 82. The scriptural source is 
Romans 14:23.
37Roberts, “Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, and a Method of ‘Virtue Ethics,’” p. 151.
38Ibid.
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Aristotle’s (or Socrates’), just as they are not identical to Nietzsche’s or 
Benjamin Franklin’s. 
One of the more constant ways Kierkegaard departs from the Aristote-
lian tradition (though his criticism is against his contemporaries, not the 
ancients) comes in his opposition to life-views anchored by the Delphic 
motto “all things in moderation.”39 Kierkegaard regularly criticizes the 
“virtue” of Klogskab, translated ‘sagacity’ by the Hongs, but also suggesting 
shrewdness, prudence, or calculation.40 Kierkegaard calls the “deification 
of sagacity” the “idolatry of our age,” and claims that “Christianly under-
stood, sensibleness, levelheadedness, and sagacity are . . . intoxication!”41 
While in the end Aristotle’s understanding of cleverness maps onto this 
idea of prudence or sagacity better than his notion of ‘practical wisdom,’ 
there is a kind of worldly wisdom (at times Kierkegaard calls it common 
sense) present in the Greeks that Kierkegaard strongly rejects.
Edward Mooney further distinguishes the kind of virtue thinker Ki-
erkegaard is and is not through a consideration of categories MacIntyre in-
troduces in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. A Traditionalist approach42 
to virtue “would typically set a goal we can achieve with effort and train-
ing. Yet some aims Kierkegaard will stress in his religious voice are aims 
we cannot achieve with effort and training. Attainment of these can only 
be welcomed as a gift from sources we cannot control.”43 Here Mooney 
points to the notion of grace that plays an important role in Kierkegaard’s 
works generally speaking, but also in his conception of virtue, and of faith 
in particular. Another divergence from a classical conception of virtue in-
volves Kierkegaard’s understanding of the qualified role of striving in the 
moral life. According to Mooney, Kierkegaard’s emphasis on “the strategy 
of releasing the will from striving (though not from passion), prevents us 
from placing him unequivocally within those versions of virtue ethics that 
place exclusive stress on the dynamic pursuit of virtue.”44 This idea of “re-
leasing the will from striving” is exemplified in Anti-Climacus’s formula 
for faith in The Sickness unto Death, where faith is described as the self’s 
resting in the power that established it, God. However, this conception 
of virtue (and faith in particular) does not disallow striving altogether. In 
another pseudonymous work, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Johannes 
39“The purely human view is of the opposite opinion, that to be sober is specifically 
marked by exercising moderation in everything, by observing in everything this sober ‘to a 
certain degree’” (Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination / Judge for Yourself!, p. 106). This also gets 
expressed in the phrase “nothing too much.”
40For more on Kierkegaard’s conception of Klogskab and his relation to Aristotle, see Mark 
A. Tietjen, “Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kierkegaard on Prudence,” in International Kierkegaard 
Commentary: Christian Discourses and The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress, ed. Robert 
L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2007), pp. 165–189.
41Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination / Judge for Yourself!, pp. 102–103.
42According to MacIntyre, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas represent this approach.
43Edward Mooney, “The Perils of Polarity: Kierkegaard and MacIntyre in Search of Moral 
Truth,” in Kierkegaard after MacIntyre, p. 250–251.
44Ibid., p. 253.
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Climacus—who, notably, is not a Christian pseudonym—claims that faith 
itself involves becoming a particular sort of person, risking a bold venture, 
working strenuously. Of course Climacus’s nuanced view, like Johannes 
de silentio’s view of Abraham’s faith in Fear and Trembling, is scripturally 
based insofar as one is told to “work out your own salvation with fear and 
trembling” (Phil. 2:12). 
That Kierkegaard’s and his pseudonyms’ views coincide is evident when 
one turns to the signed work For Self-Examination and its conception of faith 
that allows for striving. Unlike an Aristotelian view of striving, here one 
strives to become virtuous in response to God’s grace through God’s grace. 
Kierkegaard’s comments are set in the context of the classic grace-versus-
works debate that was a divisive issue in the days of St. Paul, as it was for 
Luther, and as it remains among many Christian theologians today.
There is always a secular mentality that no doubt wants to have the name of 
being Christian but wants to become Christian as cheaply as possible. This 
secular mentality became aware of Luther. . . . “If it is to be works—fine, but 
then I must also ask for the legitimate yield I have coming from my works, 
so that they are meritorious. If it is to be grace—fine, but then I must also ask 
to be free from works—otherwise it surely is not grace. If it is to be works 
and nevertheless grace, that is indeed foolishness.” Yes, that is indeed fool-
ishness; that would also be true Lutheranism; that would indeed be Chris-
tianity. Christianity’s requirement is this: your life should express works as 
strenuously as possible; then one thing more is required—that you humble 
yourself and confess: But my being saved is nevertheless grace.45
By rejecting the false dichotomy set up by those who want “to become 
Christian as cheaply as possible,” Kierkegaard carves a space for the role 
of virtues as dispositions to be achieved by works that one must strive to do 
in response to God’s grace, with the help of God’s grace. These works are not 
meritorious, but rather are compatible with salvation by grace alone. Ki-
erkegaard is explicit that salvation comes through grace, yet at this point 
one can see clearly why there is throughout his writings an emphasis on 
works, on virtues, on the cultivation of right character.
When one qualifies Kierkegaard’s understanding of virtue, one can fol-
low Quinn’s advice to see how Aquinas, the great synthesizer of Athens 
and Jerusalem, conceives of virtue. Kierkegaard would likely agree to 
his definition of the theological virtues, in particular.46 The reason faith, 
hope, and love are theological virtues is, “[F]irst, because they have God 
as their object, inasmuch as by them we are rightly ordered to God; sec-
ondly, because they are infused in us by God alone; and finally, because 
these virtues are made known to us only by divine revelation in Sacred 
Scripture.”47 Though Kirmmse is right to point out how Kierkegaard’s 
45Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination, pp. 16–17.
46For a discussion of faith, hope, and love in Kierkegaard, see For Self-Examination, pp. 
81–85.
47Thomas Aquinas, Treatise on the Virtues, trans. John A. Oesterle (Notre Dame, IN: Uni-
versity of Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 119 (question LXII). MacIntyre is correct to point out 
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Christian conception of faith is unlike any concept of classical thought, 
through carefully attending to an appropriate definition of virtue that 
takes into account Kierkegaard’s Christianity, one may better qualify the 
sort of virtue thinker Kierkegaard is and, therefore, facilitate more inter-
esting conversation with other virtue thinkers of various stripes.
MacIntyre, Austen, and Kierkegaard
Kirmmse’s intention in “Kierkegaard and MacIntyre: Possibilities for Dia-
logue,” is specifically to consider ‘points of contact’ between the two. In a 
similar spirit, I wish to spend the balance of the paper suggesting points 
of contact between Kierkegaard and the broader virtue tradition by juxta-
posing themes of his writings with those of Jane Austen’s and of contem-
porary ‘radical virtue ethics,’ a category enunciated by David Solomon. 
The former comparison was suggested indirectly by MacIntyre himself 
in After Virtue. There he writes the following about Jane Austen: 
Gilbert Ryle believed that her Aristotelianism—which he saw as the clue 
to the moral temper of her novels—may have derived from a reading of 
Shaftesbury. C.S. Lewis with equal justice saw in her an essentially Christian 
writer. It is her uniting of Christian and Aristotelian themes in a determinate 
social context that makes Jane Austen the last great effective imaginative 
voice of the tradition of thought about, and practice of, the virtues which I 
have tried to identify.48 
MacIntyre claims that not only does Austen “reproduce” the Aristote-
lian-Christian tradition, but she “extends” it in three significant ways.49 
I will briefly make mention of each of these ways—MacIntyre calls them 
“preoccupations”—to show the remarkable congruence of their con-
cerns.50 Central to my analysis is an assumption about the larger purpose 
of Kierkegaard’s works, one that corresponds to MacIntyre’s own claim 
about Austen’s novels: that the author is largely concerned with the ethi-
cal and religious edification of the reader.51 MacIntyre writes of Austen, 
that Kierkegaard and Aquinas have different conceptions of human depravity, but he seems 
to overstate their differences by claiming that they are “irreconcilable perspectives, system-
atically at odds both philosophically and theologically” (“Once More on Kierkegaard,” in 
Kierkegaard after MacIntyre, p. 353).
48MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2d. ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 
p. 240.
49Ibid., p. 241.
50My objective in this section is modest. The comparison with Austen is not part of my 
defense for reading Kierkegaard as a virtue ethicist. I intend it instead as an imaginative 
experiment contributing to my project of rethinking how we view Kierkegaard—who he is 
like and unlike as a thinker. Thus, if the comparison seems unfounded, this owes more to my 
forcing something inappropriate than to the thesis I have defended above that Kierkegaard 
is a kind of virtue thinker.
51In recounting his authorship Kierkegaard writes, “What I have wanted has been to con-
tribute, with the aid of confessions, to bringing, if possible, into these incomplete lives as we 
lead them a little more truth (in the direction of being persons of ethical and ethical-religious 
character, of renouncing worldly sagacity, of being willing to suffer for the truth, etc.), which 
indeed is always something and in any case is the first condition for beginning to exist more 
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“Her irony resides in the way that she makes her characters and her read-
ers see and say more and other than they intended to, so that they and we 
correct ourselves.”52 
Austen’s first “preoccupation” involves her practice of exposing coun-
terfeit virtues.53 Her view of morality, according to MacIntyre, “is never 
the mere inhibition and regulation of the passions,” but “is rather meant 
to educate the passions.”54 Clear illustrations of this can be found in the 
exposing of the superficial brand of romantic love shared by Lydia and 
Wickham in Pride and Prejudice, or—also in that novel—the unforgiving, 
judgmental contempt Lydia’s sister Mary has in response to Lydia’s frivo-
lous relationship. In both cases, attributes conceived by the morally im-
mature to be excellences are, in fact, found wanting. 
Kierkegaard can be found doing similar things in his examination of 
virtue concepts and, more broadly, a host of other moral, psychological, 
and theological concepts. We have already noted his attention to Klogskab, 
a worldly form of wisdom or prudence. Kierkegaard’s endless critique of 
the infiltration of Hegelianism in the Church involves exposing the coun-
terfeit intellectual virtue of reflection or reflectiveness. Kierkegaard is not 
opposed to all philosophical or theological reflection. In fact, he describes 
part of his work as an author as casting Christianity into reflection.55 Rath-
er, he rejects the sort of reflection that moves one away from existence, 
that distances one’s intellectual life from one’s ethical and religious life in 
the world.56 Like Austen, Kierkegaard also considers counterfeits to love, 
conceptions that compete with what he takes to be its highest form, Chris-
tian neighbor love. In Either/Or I numerous species of aesthetic love are 
presented in the well-known ‘Seducer’s Diary,’ the review of Mozart’s Don 
Juan and of Scribe’s play Les Premières Amours ou Les Souvenirs d’enfance. 
The exposing of the views of love presented in these pieces comes in part 
in the texts themselves; Johannes the Seducer, by the end of the diary, is 
clearly a most pathetic character with a terribly perverse sense of love. 
capably,” (The Point of View, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong [Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press,1998], p. 17). 
52MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 243 (emphasis mine). Besides the shared interest in edifying 
the reader, the literary nature of Kierkegaard’s writings lends itself more easily than other 
philosophers’ writings to comparison with novelists and literary figures such as Austen.
53The notion of counterfeit virtues seems to imply there are genuine virtues, and this in 
turn raises the question of whether genuine virtues can be understood as such only within 
a particular context or community, or whether there are objectively genuine virtues. In his 
consideration of Austen, MacIntyre seems to have in mind the contextual determination of 
virtues and their counterfeits. In Dependent Rational Animals it seems as though the virtues of 
acknowledged dependence hold without consideration of context. This sort of meta-ethical 
discussion is clearly beyond our current purposes, and so I will withhold concerns about the 
objectivity of ethics and assume that speaking of virtues in particular contexts does not entail 
moral relativism. 
54Ibid., p. 241.
55See The Point of View, pp. 7, 55–56.
56Kierkegaard speaks of and critiques this breed of reflection in the last section of Two 
Ages. 
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Critique also comes in the companion volume Either/Or II, whose pseud-
onymous author, Judge William, represents the ethical sphere of existence 
and aims to show how the aesthetic view of love is deficient and corrected 
by his own conception. The views of love in both volumes are at times di-
rectly, at times indirectly critiqued in Kierkegaard’s signed Works of Love, 
particularly in those passages that distinguish between preferential love 
and neighbor love.
The second ‘preoccupation’ MacIntyre notes in Austen involves “the 
central place she assigns to self-knowledge, a Christian rather than a 
Socratic self-knowledge which can only be achieved through a kind of 
repentance.”57 This is perhaps epitomized most poignantly in Elizabeth 
Bennet’s stark realization halfway through Pride and Prejudice, when she 
sees her vicious attitude toward Mr. Darcy for what it is: “Till this mo-
ment I never knew myself.”58 Or consider one of Emma’s many moments 
of ‘coming to herself’:
To understand, thoroughly understand her own heart, was the first endeav-
our. To that point went every leisure moment which her father’s claims on her 
allowed, and every moment of involuntary absence of mind. . . . She saw that 
there never had been a time when she did not consider Mr Knightley as infi-
nitely the superior, or when his regard for her had not been infinitely the most 
dear. She saw, that in persuading herself, in fancying, in acting to the contrary, 
she had been entirely under a delusion, totally ignorant of her own heart—
and, in short, that she had never really cared for Frank Churchill at all! 
This was the conclusion of the first series of reflection. That was the 
knowledge of herself, on the first question of enquiry, which she reached; 
and without being long in reaching it—She was most sorrowfully indignant; 
ashamed of every sensation but the one revealed to her—her affection for 
Mr Knightley—Every other part of her mind was disgusting.59
Kierkegaard’s concern with assisting readers toward self-knowledge is 
as obvious as the title of one work, For Self-Examination, and the similar sub-
title of another, Judge for Yourself! For Self-Examination Recommended to the 
Present Age. There and elsewhere Kierkegaard writes scriptural devotions 
based on I Peter 4:7, “Therefore be sober.” While Kierkegaard expresses his 
admiration for Socrates who, he notes, “did not know for certain whether 
he was a human being” and thus devoted his life to self-knowledge and 
examination, he too transforms the Socratic insight into a Christian one by 
directing his contemporaries toward a better understanding of and com-
mitment to the ideals of Christian existence. Tying together the exposing 
of counterfeit virtues or inadequate spheres of existence with the interest 
in cultivating self-examination, we can better understand this entry from 
Kierkegaard’s journal: “Using my diagram, a young person should be able 
to see very accurately beforehand, just as on a price-list if you venture this 
57MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 241.
58Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice (New York: Bantam, 1981), p. 156.
59Jane Austen, Emma (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 2003), pp. 494–495.
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far out, the conditions are thus and so, this to win, and that to lose; and if 
you venture out this far these are the conditions, etc.”60
The third way Austen extends the Aristotelian-Christian tradition, ac-
cording to MacIntyre, pertains to the concept of constancy in her work. 
Especially in Mansfield Park and Persuasion, Austen writes about the vir-
tue of constancy, hoping to convey as MacIntyre describes it “that unity 
can no longer be treated as a mere presupposition or context for a virtu-
ous life.”61 For Austen constancy is a virtue that orders a life as one life. 
It involves a depth of character that includes steadfastness and ongoing 
commitment to one’s ideals both when those ideals are tested and when 
they are untested. MacIntyre notes constancy’s close, though distinct 
place beside other virtues like patience and courage.62 In the context of 
his own moral philosophy, where MacIntyre emphasizes a life’s having 
narrative structure and unity, he borrows this notion of constancy from 
Austen. Interestingly, however, he credits Kierkegaard with having dis-
tinguished between the kind of existence that is fragmented and lacks 
unity (i.e., the aesthetic) and that which, conversely, can be characterized 
by unity (i.e., the ethical) grounded in one’s “commitments and responsi-
bilities to the future.”63 
MacIntyre describes Austen’s conception of constancy as “a recogni-
tion of a particular kind of threat to the integrity of the personality in the 
peculiarly modern social world.”64 Once again a similar concern may be 
found in Kierkegaard’s attack on speculative reflectiveness as a kind of in-
tellectual activity that threatens the integrity of the personality. This threat 
takes shape in speculative philosophy’s backward orientation, which in-
volves a kind of aestheticizing of life. This includes both an approach to 
world history as a disinterested spectator (the assumption is that there is 
nothing for the individual to learn from such study) and a difficulty view-
ing one’s own life in terms of unity. Kierkegaard believes this “threat” has 
made its way from the ivory towers of academia to the common person, 
via the pulpit. “[A]n erroneous scholarship has confused Christianity, and 
from the scholarship the confusion has in turn sneaked into the religious 
address, so that one not infrequently hears pastors who in all scholarly 
naïveté bona fide prostitute Christianity.”65 For Kierkegaard, the unity of a 
human life—the possibility for integrity—can flourish only if it has a good 
60Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers v.1, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. 
Hong (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1967), p.  455.
61MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 242.
62Ibid.
63Ibid. Of course, for Kierkegaard, the ethical has its own share of chinks in the armor. 
Perhaps the book that considers most directly a fragmented self is The Sickness unto Death, 
which directs the reader beyond the category of ‘the ethical’ ultimately to Christian faith 
(Religiousness B in Johannes Climacus’s language).
64Ibid.
65Søren Kierkegaard, The Book on Adler, trans. and ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 174.
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start. However, the authority on moral upbringing, the Church, has failed, 
and the result is great confusion both about its own responsibility and 
about Christianity itself. The confusion rises to the surface when children 
are brought up to think that by virtue of being born in a ‘Christian coun-
try’ they are Christians.
the person who, without having received the slightest decisive impression 
of the essentially Christian, who from the very beginning is strengthened in 
the notion that he is a Christian—he is deceived. How in all the world will 
it occur to him to be concerned about whether he is, or about becoming, 
what he in his earliest recollection has been convinced that he is as a matter 
of course? Everything has strengthened him in this conviction. Nothing has 
brought him to a halt. The parents have never spoken about the essentially 
Christian; they have thought: The pastor must do that. And the pastor has 
thought: Instruct the lad in religion, that I can surely do, but actually convey 
to him the decisive impression, that must be the parents’ affair.66
Kierkegaard goes on to say that the essential question to a grown-up 
Dane, “are you a Christian?” sounds as foolish as if one were to ask “are 
you a human?” The unified moral tradition of Christianity that, as Ma-
cIntyre says, is characterized by a unique set of practices and norms has 
been contaminated, and the result is the disintegration of the personal-
ity instead. The disintegration is not apparent given the illusion “that 
people are Christians—people whose vocabulary is Christian but whose 
concepts are roughly Hegelian, who discuss Christianity volubly but 
whose passions, emotions, and practice are left unshaped by Christian 
thoughts, who subtly defend themselves against the inroads of God’s 
spirit by evaluating themselves solely with reference to the social herd in 
which they dwell.”67 
What the illusion hides is precisely the absence of integration of one’s 
Christian beliefs and commitments with one’s life. This integration is what 
is at stake in Johannes Climacus’s well-known distinction between objec-
tive and subjective relations to ethical and religious truth in Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript. To relate to truth subjectively is precisely to make 
that which one believes to be objectively true inward, to appropriate it in 
one’s life—‘passions, emotions, and practice.’ Of course such appropria-
tion or inwardness occurs gradually over time through habituation, and 
yet like Austen, Kierkegaard believes it is largely absent in Christendom. 
Perhaps the best expression of Kierkegaard’s particularly Christian con-
cept of integrity, one compatible with Austen’s view of constancy, comes 
from a selection in Christian Discourses: “What is honesty before God? It is 
that your life expresses what you say.”68
66Ibid., p. 138.
67Robert C. Roberts, Faith, Reason, and History: Rethinking Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Frag-
ments (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1986), p. 3.
68Søren Kierkegaard, Christian Discourse; The Crisis and A Crisis in the Life of an Actress, 
trans. and ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1997), p. 167. 
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Kierkegaard and Radical Virtue Ethics
While Austen opens the door to conceiving of Kierkegaard as a Chris-
tian virtue thinker by exemplifying how one might take both traditions 
seriously, David Solomon’s category of radical virtue ethics expands the 
discussion in a different direction by offering a possible way of under-
standing Kierkegaard’s ethical thought in relation to contemporary moral 
philosophy.69 In “Virtue Ethics: Radical or Routine?” Solomon distin-
guishes between two divergent approaches to virtue ethics: radical and 
routine.70 Though the context of Solomon’s argument is an assessment of 
virtue epistemology, the distinction he draws is instructive for placing Ki-
erkegaard in conversation with contemporary ethics. 
For Solomon, routine virtue ethics is the product of those “who do 
ethics in such a way that their work fits neatly within the conventions 
of contemporary analytic normative theory.”71 The routine virtue ethicist 
conceives of the difference between virtue ethics and its deontological and 
consequentialist rivals as one about “which moral notion plays the pri-
mary role within the overall structure of the normative theory.”72 Yet, as 
Solomon points out, virtue ethics in this way bears much similarity to its 
rivals in virtue of being organized around one particular moral notion. He 
suggests, however, that in the work of Elizabeth Anscombe or Alasdair 
MacIntyre one finds something much different; their conception of moral 
philosophy involves not simply a disagreement about which moral con-
cept is central to their theory but a ‘radical’ reconceiving of ethical theoriz-
ing altogether. Drawing on sources ranging from Aristotle to Bernard Wil-
liams, radical virtue ethics according to Solomon aims to rethink entirely 
how ethics should be done. What follows is a partial list of the themes of 
radical virtue ethics, according to Solomon:
3. A turn for an understanding of the ethical life to concrete terms like the vir-
tue terms in preference to more abstract terms like ‘good,’ ‘right,’ and ‘ought.’
4. A critique of modernity and especially the models of practical rationality 
that underlie such Enlightenment theories as Kantian deontology and Ben-
thamite consequentialism . . . .
5. An emphasis on the importance of community, especially local commu-
nities, both in introducing human beings to the ethical life and sustaining 
their practice of central features of that life. This emphasis is typically con-
trasted with the individualism that seems to many advocates of virtue ethics 
to permeate Kantian and consequentialist approaches to ethics.
69On the question of how Kierkegaard’s ethical thought relates more generally to contem-
porary moral philosophy, see Evans’s Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love, which places a Kierkegaard-
ian derived divine command ethic beside three alternative meta-ethical views. 
70David Solomon, “Virtue Ethics: Radical or Routine?” in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives 
from Ethics and Epistemology, ed. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), pp. 57–80.
71Ibid., p. 66. He cites Michael Slote’s work as an example of routine virtue ethics.
72Ibid., p. 67.
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6. A focus on the importance of the whole life as the primary object of ethi-
cal evaluation in contrast to the tendency of Kantian and consequentialist 
theorists to give primacy to the evaluation of actions or more fragmented 
features of human lives.
7. An emphasis on the narrative structure of human life as opposed to the 
more episodic picture of human life found in neo-Kantian and consequen-
tialist approaches to ethics . . . .
10. A special emphasis on thick moral education understood as involving 
training in the virtues as opposed to models of moral education frequently 
associated with neo-Kantian and consequentialist moral theories which tend 
to emphasize growth in autonomy or in detached instrumental rationality.73
Each of these presents an opportunity for exploration of the ways in which 
Kierkegaard’s approach to ethics stands in contrast to his modern counter-
parts and aligns more closely with those of the virtue tradition. I will focus 
on the third and tenth themes especially and then consider the fifth as a 
potential counterexample to viewing Kierkegaard in this vein.
Roberts has compared Kierkegaard’s writing on the virtues and other 
concepts of moral psychology to a “microscopic travelogue” that carefully 
charts a diamond’s intricacies and facets from countless different angles.74 
This metaphor speaks to Kierkegaard’s non-reductive approach to ethics 
and ethical concepts. Just as a diamond has multiple facets and each facet 
looks a certain way from a certain angle, so do ethical concepts have mul-
tiple facets that appear in greater richness and complexity when they are 
approached dialectically, from the unique angles of other concepts. 
Kierkegaard’s endless attention to the clarification of ethical concepts, 
suggested already in his exposing of counterfeit virtues, extends through-
out all of his writings, including both signed and pseudonymous writings. 
In Either/Or II, Judge William addresses a whole host of concepts that he 
feels the aesthete ‘A’ deeply misunderstands, e.g., love and duty. In Fear 
and Trembling, Johannes de silentio attempts to clarify what faith is and 
what it is not, even though he attests that he lacks faith himself. In the 
signed, upbuilding discourses published concurrently with the aforemen-
tioned pseudonymous pieces, we find discourse after discourse expound-
ing concepts like faith, hope, courage, patience, obedience, long-suffering, 
humility, and joy. In The Book on Adler, Kierkegaard targets a particular 
instance where Christian language is misunderstood and thus misused—
especially the concepts of revelation and authority. Works of Love offers a 
comprehensive elucidation of the concept of Christian love, particularly as 
it stands in contrast to erotic love and friendship. One might claim (with 
Kierkegaard), that the overall concept he aims to clarify throughout his 
works is what it means to become a Christian, itself. As he writes, “I do not 
73Ibid., p0. 68–69.
74See “Kierkegaard and Ethical Theory,” in Ethics, Love, and Faith in Kierkegaard: A Phil-
osophical Engagement, ed. Edward F. Mooney (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
2008), pp. 72–92.
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say of myself that I am a remarkable Christian . . . But I do maintain that I 
know with uncommon clarity and definiteness what Christianity is, what 
can be required of the Christian, what it means to be a Christian.”75 
In The Sickness unto Death and The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonyms take up despair and anxiety, respectively, concepts Roberts 
calls ‘diagnostic emotions.’ Though seemingly less ‘concrete’ than some 
virtue concepts such as love or generosity, even these explorations move 
beyond the standard normative theorizing of modernity that confine most 
of their attention to reductive rules or general states of affairs. Roberts 
describes another category of these more concrete concepts as ‘dimen-
sions,’ which refer to subjectivity, inwardness, and passion, each of which 
garners significant attention in the pseudonymous Postscript.76 Thus, in 
his analysis of all kinds of thick concepts of moral psychology, Kierkeg-
aard seems to be performing the kind of philosophical activity Elizabeth 
Anscombe would later call for when she made clear the need for “an ac-
count of human nature, human action, the type of characteristic a virtue 
is, and above all human ‘flourishing’.”77 Of course Kierkegaard’s moral 
psychology is Christian and its scope and appeal are limited accordingly; 
nevertheless, his attention to thick ethical concepts distinguishes his ap-
proach from many of his modern counterparts. 
Kierkegaard also exemplifies the radical virtue ethicist’s emphasis on 
‘thick moral education,’ a view which incidentally places Kierkegaard 
closer beside classical Greek culture. This theme is especially transparent 
in a distinction Kierkegaard draws between ‘instruction’ and ‘upbring-
ing’ in The Book on Adler. In this posthumously published work, Kierkeg-
aard offers analysis of a revelation claim by a rural pastor and theolo-
gian, Adolph Peter Adler, to illustrate the religious confusion of the age. 
Central to Kierkegaard’s critique of Adler is Adler’s deficient moral and 
spiritual education.
On the whole it is certainly characteristic of our age that the concept of up-
bringing, at least in the understanding of antiquity, is disappearing more and 
more from the speech and lives of people. In antiquity the importance of a 
person’s upbringing was valued very highly, and it was understood as a har-
monious development of that which will carry the various gifts and talents 
and the disposition of the personality ethically in the direction of character. 
In our day there seems to be an impatient desire to do away with this up-
bringing and on the other hand to emphasize instruction.78
The replacement of holistic education that has as a significant aim the cul-
tivation of both moral and intellectual virtues by a model that presumes 
75Kierkegaard, The Point of View, p. 138. 
76See Roberts’s entry on Kierkegaard in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion, 
ed. Chad Meister and Paul Copan (New York: Routledge Press, 2007).
77G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” in Virtue Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp and 
Michael Slote (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 43–44.
78Kierkegaard, The Book on Adler, p. 133.
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a rationalistic conception of human nature and education, one more in-
terested in ‘facts’ (cf. Dickens’s Hard Times) than the development of char-
acter and the relation of facts to concerns, rings eerily true in our age as 
it does for Kierkegaard’s. It is, in fact, the lack of “care for the soul” as 
Socrates would put it, plus the general absence of passion and presence 
of religious confusion that causes Kierkegaard to see the need for such 
an upbringing—both his own and his contemporaries.’ This emphasis on 
education as upbringing coincides with the noted emphasis on integrity. 
Only in the sort of moral and spiritual education that aims at the upbring-
ing of a whole person can the integration of one’s mind, emotions, and 
actions be fostered.
Conclusion
I conclude by considering one more objection to reading Kierkegaard as 
a member of the broad virtue tradition: the centrality of community in 
the ethical life (number five above). Many commentators who have no 
stake in a virtue thesis have critiqued Kierkegaard’s individualism, his 
inattention to community, and the misogynist threads that at times ap-
pear very glaring in his work. These commentators also correctly point to 
his thin ecclesiology, his apparent lack of interest in imagining a healthy 
Church. It is true that Kierkegaard places less emphasis than he should 
on the possible role of the community and the Church. In fact, he views 
the Church as more part of the problem than the solution. Nevertheless, 
his thought still focuses on the development of traits through relation-
ships, even though the relation with God (which is for him a real relation) 
turns out to be crucial for the acquisition of these traits.79 In Works of Love, 
Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the individual is placed in the context of one’s 
moral and spiritual obligation to others. “The essentially Christian is this: 
truly to love oneself is to love God; truly to love another person is with 
every sacrifice . . . to help the other person to love God or in loving God.”80 
And Kierkegaard’s thought throughout Works of Love echoes I John 4:8: 
“Whoever does not love, does not know God, for God is love.” Thus, Ki-
erkegaard’s focus on the category of the individual cannot be considered 
outside of the obligation to care for and love the other. In one of the most 
moving passages in all of his writings, Kierkegaard’s emphasis on indi-
viduality is clearly placed in the context of that which forms the basis of 
all human relations, the relation to God (or eternity):
In being king, beggar, rich man, poor man, male, female, etc., we are not like 
each other—therein we are indeed different. But in being the neighbor we 
are all unconditionally like each other. Dissimilarity is temporality’s method 
of confusing that marks every human being differently, but the neighbor is 
eternity’s mark—on every human being. Take many sheets of paper, write 
something different on each one; then no one will be like another. But then 
79Cf. Evans, “A Kierkegaardian View of the Foundations of Morality,” pp. 66–68. 
80Kierkegaard, Works of Love, p. 114.
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again take each single sheet; do not let yourself be confused by the diverse in-
scriptions, hold it up to the light, and you will see a common watermark on all 
of them. In the same way the neighbor is the common watermark, but you see 
it only by means of eternity’s light when it shines through the dissimilarity.81
That one’s relation to others is mediated by a relation to God obviously 
implies that there is something quite different about Kierkegaard’s form 
of virtue ethics, in comparison with many figures of the classical virtue 
tradition. But that is simply what one would expect when contrasting a 
Christian and a pagan thinker. 
In the course of considering several objections to the thesis that Ki-
erkegaard should be read alongside other virtue thinkers ranging from 
the ancient Greeks to MacIntyre, I have offered a preliminary definition of 
a virtue according to Kierkegaard: dispositions to be achieved by works that 
one must strive to do in response to God’s grace, with the help of God’s grace. I 
have noted how his emphasis on duty and God’s commands are compat-
ible with a like emphasis on moral striving and the virtues. I have also ex-
plored how Kierkegaard’s thought shares key features with both popular 
and scholarly approaches to the virtues. Clearly more clarifying work on 
this topic must be done. For those like Kirmmse who take seriously Ki-
erkegaard’s Christianity, however, I have argued that one need not close 
the door so quickly to the ways in which Kierkegaard’s philosophy might 
be read beside thinkers ranging from Plato to MacIntyre.
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81Ibid., p. 89.
